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I. Introduction
When an economy is well organized, it is more productive. Organization
results from the matching of factors of production. But the formation of matches
and the replacement of degraded matches require resources. The most visible use
of resources for reorganization is unemployment. During the time that workers are
trying to find positions that exploit their comparative advantages, they are not
producing output. Consequently, the economy faces a tradeoff between
production and reorganization. The tradeoff is similar to the tradeoff between
producing consumption goods and producing investment goods.
A probabilistic matching model provides a good starting point for studying
reorganization. In the model I use, matches gradually deteriorate over time.
Eventually, the time comes when it is in the interest of the matched factors (here,
two workers) to part company. That decision launches a period when they invest
in reorganization. Each worker makes a new, high-productivity match and
resumes producing output. In the steady state, these decisions occur randomly
over time and the aggregate flow of reorganizational investment is constant over
time.
In the comparison of steady states, there is a single decision—the cutoff
age where matches are broken and reorganization begins. In an economy with a
stringent cutoff that ends matches before they have deteriorated very much, the
flow of reorganizational investment is high. Output available for consumption is
correspondingly lower. On the other hand, the average match has a higher
productivity, so output is higher on that account. If there are no externalities in
matching, the decentralized economy will find the optimal balance of
reorganization and production. As I will show, there is an exact analogy in steady3
states between a model with a flow reorganizational investment and one with a
flow of investment in physical capital.
The opportunity to substitute between reorganization and production
results in interesting dynamics. First, a period when productivity is temporarily
low in the production of goods causes a sharp move toward reorganization, whose
value becomes relatively higher during the period. That is, a temporary decline in
productivity causes a spike in unemployment. The remaining dynamics are
controlled by the speed of matching the burst of unemployed workers.
Second, in a model where the interest rate is an exogenous driving force, a
period of a temporarily increased interest rate can also cause a burst of
reorganization. This may appear paradoxical. An increased interest rate ordinarily
discourages investment. A higher interest rate should keep workers in jobs longer
than normal, because the output they are currently producing has a higher value in
relation to the improved productivity they would enjoy later if they searched for
new jobs. Two realistic factors in the model offset this general tendency,
however. Once is that the model takes physical capital to be complementary to
labor input . Consequently, a temporarily high interest rate induces disinvestment
in that capital, and, at the same time, the release of the corresponding workers to
find new jobs. This mechanism is described in detail in Hall [1999a] with
accompanying empirical evidence. The other factor is to make the period of a
high interest rate occur so quickly that the output that would be produced by
retaining workers who otherwise would have terminated their matches and sought
new ones. This assumption removes the intertemporal substitution effect toward
lower reorganization and leaves only the substitution effect away from physical
capital.4
II. Matching
Matching reorganizes the economy. I will start by examining a particular
matching process, rather than adopt the concept of a general matching function
that has become standard since Diamond [1982] and Mortensen [1982]. The
primary reason to be more specific about matching is to understand the conflicting
forces of agglomeration and congestion in search. Agglomeration—first studied
by Diamond—means that search is more efficient when the number of other
searchers is higher. Congestion means the opposite—searchers interfere with each
others' job seeking. Common sense suggests that congestion dominates, so it is
harder to find a job when unemployment is high than when it is low. Data from
the U.S. economy do not support that view, however. Flows of new hires track
unemployment in rough proportion, which suggests that the job-finding rate is
about the same whether unemployment is high or low. Hall [1991] discusses
evidence supporting the hypothesis that the matching rate is constant, but the
topic is ripe for further investigation; the existing evidence is far from definitive.
Diamond's paper in 1982 studied a pure bilateral matching model, where
workers search for partners. The model has no distinct concept of an employer—
the firm is just the partnership of two matched workers. The huge literature
associated with Mortensen and Pissarides—including Diamond's subsequent work
with Blanchard [1990]—has made the employer a separate economic actor (see
Mortensen and Pissarides [1999]). Employers draw employment opportunities
from a distribution. If the prospective profit warrants, the employer declares a job
vacancy and begins to search for a worker. The flow of matches resulting from
stocks of searching workers and searching employers is described by a matching
function. Generally, the function is taken to have constant returns in the two
stocks. The model is closed by the equilibrium condition that the prospective
profit of an incremental employer is zero.5
I will return to Diamond's simpler model in order to develop ideas about
reorganization. In my model, the extent of the economy's organization depends on
the quality of the matching of workers in productive partnerships. The firm is a
collection of workers. I view the Mortensen-Pissarides model as containing two
kinds of labor: production workers and managers. An unemployed manager is
called a vacancy. My model has only one kind of labor and the firm is a
partnership of two similar workers. There are two essential aspects of the
technology—the matching process and the evolution of the productivity of the
resulting matches.
For the matching process, I consider the following setup. There are  N
searchers hoping to form partnerships. They are identical, so they pair off with the
first people they find. The economy has  S matching stations. Each period, each
searcher visits a station at random. The probability that a given searcher will visit
a given station is 
1
S
. The distribution of the number of searchers at a given station





KJ . The probability that a given station will have an odd number
of visitors is, for large  N and  S, 
1
2
2 - - e N S /
 (see the Appendix for derivation). All
searchers are matched except one at each station with an odd number of searchers,




















































Figure 1. Matching function, no congestion
The vertical axis shows the percentage of searchers matched in one period. The
horizontal axis is the ratio of the number of searchers to the number of matching stations.
Figure 1 shows the matching function. It is strictly increasing—the
likelihood of one searcher finding a partner rises with the number of searchers.
The matching technology has agglomeration effects but no congestion effects.
Agglomeration arises in the following way: When there are few searchers, most
of them visit stations by themselves, so they are odd searchers who do not form
matches. The more searchers there are per  station, the lower the fraction of odd
outcomes and the higher the fraction matched. There is no limit to the number of
matches that can occur at a given station.
A simple modification introduces congestion effects that compete with the
natural agglomeration of search. Suppose that the maximum number of
partnerships that can be created at a station is one. Each station generates a pair of
matched workers if two or more searchers show up, and no match otherwise. The
probability that no searcher will visit a given station is, for large  N and  S,  e N S - / .7
The probability that a single searcher will visit is 
N
S
e N S - / . In all other cases,














































Figure 2. Matching function with congestion.
Figure 2 shows the matching function with congestion. When the number
of searchers is less that about 1.8 times the number of matching stations,
agglomeration effects dominate.
1 Increasing the number of searchers raises the
matching rate. As before, agglomeration results from a decline in the fraction of
stations visited by a single searcher. Above the critical ratio, congestion
dominates. With a higher number of searchers, more of them visit stations that8
already have two searchers and therefore cannot make another match. Other
matching functions  m N S 2( / ),   m N S 3( / ) , and so on, could be defined by
placing limits of 2, 3, or more on the number of pairs that could be created at each
station. For these matching functions, agglomeration effects would continue at
higher values of  S/N.
My discussion presumes that the number of stations is held constant. If, on
the other hand, the number of stations is adjusted to remain in a prescribed
proportion, say  r, to the number of searchers, then the matching rate would always
be the constant,  m r i() .
If the number of matching stations is chosen optimally given the number
of searchers, then the ratio  N/S will exceed the critical level of 1.8. Otherwise, a
reduction in the number of stations would both avoid the costs of those stations
and raise the matching rate. The higher the cost of a station, the more the optimal
ratio exceeds 1.8. Similarly, if the number of matching stations is chosen before
the number of searchers is known, then, roughly speaking, the optimal choice will
aim to place the typical value of the ratio  N/S somewhat above 1.8.
Thus, there are two reasons to expect that the matching rate should be
approximately constant: First, the number of matching stations may adjust in
proportion to the number of searchers. Second, the number of matching stations
may be chosen to be a constant so that the ratio of searchers to stations is close to
the maximum of the matching function. Variations in the ratio will take place
across the flat part of the matching function near its maximum. In addition, as I
mentioned earlier, the data suggest that the job-finding rate is roughly constant
across wide variations in the unemployment rate.
                                                                                                                       
1 The ratio of searchers to stations that maximizes the matching rate is the positive root of
e r r r = + + 1 2, which is 1.793.9
The rest of my discussion will assume that there is a fixed matching rate.
As I noted earlier, there is evidence supporting this view, but it is far from
conclusive.
III. Reorganization in the Steady State
In the model developed here, the productivity of a match declines with its
age. The economy needs to reorganize itself continually , else aggregate
productivity would drift downward as all matches degrade. At a certain point in
the life of each match, it becomes desirable for the partnership to dissolve and for
the former partners to seek new, more productive matches. Absent such
deterioration of match quality, the economy would organize itself into permanent
partnerships once and for all, and thereafter would never need to reorganize.
In order to focus on the issue of reorganization, I exclude other
determinants of the evolution of the joint value of a match over time. In particular,
I do not consider the accumulation of match-specific capital, nor do I consider
that the partners in a match learn about the value of the match (see Pries [1998]).
These  factors help to explain a key feature of the U.S. labor market: a pronounced
decline in the hazard of separation with job duration (see Hall [1982]). In the
simple model of this section, all matches end at the same age, quite contrary to
fact. When I take up the dynamics of the model, I alter this assumption, but I do
not attempt to be realistic with respect to the separation hazard. What matters for
the model is that there are always some matches whose joint value is nearing zero,
so that it is likely that separation will occur soon. In my model, this occurs simply
as a result of the age of the match. In a more realistic model, it is the result of
various random processes—learning about match quality, increases in the values
of opportunities outside the match, and idiosyncratic factors in match quality.10




(matched) workers become unemployed. It will be convenient at this point to
switch to continuous time. Let  u be the fraction of workers unemployed. Then the
flow of workers into unemployment is 
1-u
D
 and the flow out is  mu, where  m is
the matching or job-finding rate derived in the previous section. In the steady







The unemployment rate  u is the flow of investment in reorganization. A







In the steady state, matches will be distributed uniformly in the interval
0 , D  in age. I assume that the productivity of a match declines  from its initial
value of 1 unit of output per worker to  e-wt  at age  t . The average output of



















This formula embodies the fundamental tradeoff between employment and
reorganization. A higher flow of reorganization—a higher value of  u—lowers
output by reducing employment, but it raises output by increasing the productivity
of those who are employed.11
A. Comparison of physical and organizational investment
There is an exact analogy in steady states between the reorganization
model and a two-sector model with physical capital. In the capital-goods sector of
the analog economy, one unit of labor produces one unit of capital. In the
consumption-goods sector, labor and capital combine to produce output according
to the constant-returns production function,  Lf K L / b g. Here  L is employment in
the consumption sector and  K is the capital stock. Let  u be the fraction of the
labor force in the capital sector and let  d  be the rate of deterioration of capital.
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 be the
capital/labor ratio in the consumption goods sector. Then the output of
consumption goods is  1-u f k b g b g.

























, the steady-state stock of organizational capital. Then the flow of
output is  ( ) () 1-u f k , where










This is a  well behaved neoclassical technology, with  ¢ ‡ f k b g 0 and  ¢¢ £ f k b g 0.
Thus the reorganization model is exactly analogous in the steady state to a
































































































































































































Figure 3. Steady-state Output as a Function of Unemployment
Figure 3 shows steady-state output as a function of the flow of organizational
investment,  u. At zero investment, output is zero. Small increments to investment
result in sharp increases in output as they dramatically improve the organization
of the economy by eliminating matches whose  productivities have fallen to low
levels thanks to advancing age. Output reaches its maximum at about 5 percent
unemployment. Above this level, improvements in productivity from improved
organization are more than offset by the decline in employment.
The maximum shown in Figure 3 has the same interpretation as the
Golden Rule of Saving. No rational economy would ever invest to a point to the
right of the maximum. With a positive interest rate, the economy will choose a13
point to the left of the maximum, because the opportunity cost of the
organizational capital needs to be considered in choosing the optimum.
B. Reorganization and the vintage capital model
Organizational investment does not satisfy the conditions for capital
aggregation, so there is no strict concept of an organizational capital stock outside
the steady state. Rather, the model developed here is analogous to a two-sector
vintage capital model, where the surviving stock of each previous period's
investment has a distinct role in production. In the analogous vintage capital
model, it takes 
1
m
 units of labor to produce one unit of capital. Production of final
goods requires one unit of labor and one unit of capital. Capital of age  t  produces
e-wt  units of output. In the steady state, capital remains in use until it reaches a
cutoff age  D.
C. Optimal investment in reorganization
By optimality, I mean the maximization of the present value of output,
given an exogenous interest rate, taken for now as a constant. Consider for the
moment the case of a finite time horizon,  T. Let  s be the amount of time until  T,
s T t = - . Further, let  U s ()  be the value associated with searching and let  W s (,) t
be the value associated with a match formed  t  years before the horizon,
measured  s years before the horizon ( t ‡ s). These values obey
&() (,) () U s mW s s m r U s = - + b g (3.5)
In comparison to the immediate future, the value of searching is higher by the
flow of value from the likelihood of finding a job and exiting search,  mW s s (,) ,
and lower by the “interest” earned from searching,  m r U s + b g () .14
The optimal decision between remaining in an aging match and leaving to
search for a new one is governed by the comparison of the values of the two











w t b g  . (3.6)
The option to end the match implies
W s W s U s (,) max~(,),() t t =  . (3.7)
With specified terminal conditions, say  U() 0 0 =  and  W(,) , 0 0 t t = " ,
finding the optimal path is a matter of integrating these equations. Because the
system has all negative roots, it has the turnpike property that the terminal
conditions become unimportant as the horizon becomes distant. It is
straightforward to find the unique match duration  D that satisfies the steady-state
condition for the unemployment value,
0 0 = - + mW m r U b g (3.8)
where  W W s s 0= (,)  is the stationary value of new matches and  U is the stationary



















Finally, the optimality condition for match duration requires
e rU D - = w  . (3.11)15
A match should be abandoned when its flow of output is the same as the
opportunity cost of the time, as determined by the value of searching.
These equations do not have a closed-form solution, but it is
straightforward to solve them numerically by searching over D. As noted earlier,
the optimum involves a lower level of investment in reorganization (a lower
unemployment rate) than the Golden Rule. In the example developed earlier,
where the Golden Rule unemployment rate was 4.8 percent, the optimal
unemployment rate at 6 percent annual interest is 4.3 percent.
IV. Reorganization and Search Capital
Whenever a relationship requires search, the successfully matched parties
have search capital. Unless something changes in the environment or in the
benefits of the match, they will remain matched in order to preserve the capital
value of the match. What is the relation between reorganization and search
capital?
First, consider an economy that never needs to reorganize. For example,
set  w = 0 in the model just developed. In the steady state, the economy will not
devote any resources to reorganization. Nonetheless, it will have search capital.
Each permanently matched partnership will have a positive joint match value
associated with its original search effort. The total amount of search capital will
be the resources that would be necessary to place all workers back into
partnerships if all of the existing partnerships were destroyed.
In an economy with depreciable search capital, a flow of reorganization
effort will be needed to maintain the optimal allocation. What is fundamental is
the flow of reorganization, not the idea of a capital stock. The stock could just as16
well be labeled the stock of search capital. As the previous section noted, there is
no useful concept of organizational capital except in comparing steady states.
V.  Dynamics
It is more instructive to consider the dynamics in a discrete-time version of
the model. I will also introduce two additional features of the model at this stage.
First, I will make the process of degradation be random rather than
deterministic—this eliminates what would otherwise be extreme and unrealistic
echo effects from bursts of job destruction. The modification does not result in a
realistic separation hazard over job duration, however. With probability  p  each















; otherwise, it continues to produce the same amount. Second, I will
bring physical capital into the model by assuming that the partnership is required
to hold  g  units of output as capital during the period in order to produce. The
model is the same as in Hall [1999a] except that I do not consider uncertainty.
The value transition equations for the model are, in notation analogous to
that in the previous section,
U
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1 1 1 1 b g (5.2)17
In equation 5.1, the new partnership has to invest in  g  units of capital in order to
set up shop. In equation 5.2, the productivity of all partnerships is perturbed by a
time effect,  zt . The partnership has the option of dissolution, in which case it
recovers its capital,  g . The fact that dissolution (job destruction) provides
immediate output is important in the dynamic response to increases in interest
rates, as discussed more extensively in Hall [1999a].
The solution for the dynamic path of employment and unemployment
involves two steps. First, starting from appropriate terminal values (such as the
steady state), iterate equations 5.1 and 5.2 backwards in time to find the values
associated with the productivity states and unemployment. In particular, in each
period, note which states will have positive employment because the left side of
the max in equation 5.2 holds and which states will have zero employment
because the right side holds. Then iterate the allocation transition equations
forward in time. They are:
n mu n t t t 0, 1 0,1 1 = + - - - p b g (5.3)
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1 1 1 b g  ,  if state   is viable
 otherwise
(5.4)
u m u d t t t = - + - 1 1 b g (5.5)
Here  dt  is job destruction, the sum over all non-viable productivity states of the
right-hand side of equation 5.4.
In the steady state, jobs last until they transit to  productivity state  D, at
which time they are destroyed and the workers enter the reorganization process by
becoming unemployed. As discussed in section 2, the value of  D is chosen to18
maximize the present value of output. The expected duration of a job is 
D
p








. In the steady state,
employed workers are distributed equally among the  D productivity states.
I use the steady state as the initial conditions at  t = 0 for the dynamic
system 5.3 through 5.5. Then I use the value transition equations 5.1 and 5.2 with
a perturbed value of either the productivity time effect or the interest rate to
introduce a shock at  t =1 . The result is a departure from normal job destruction in
period 1. Then I use equations 5.3 through 5.5 to calculate the dynamic response
to the temporary change in job destruction.
The parameters and steady-state values of the driving forces in my
calculations are:
Parameter or variable Interpretation Value
m Matching rate 0.3 per quarter
w Productivity degradation step 1.3 percent
g Capital/output ratio 6
p Probability of productivity
degradation
13 percent per quarter
r Stationary interest rate 2 percent per quarter
D Threshold productivity step 9
u Unemployment rate 4.6 percent
Notice that the allocation transition equations 4.3 through 4.5 are a first-
order Markoff process during any period when the value transition equations 4.1
and 4.2 are at their stationary point. Thus, for any impulse that affects the values
only in the first period, the impulse response functions will have the same shape
and will be governed by the Markoff process. The key assumption underlying this
property is the constancy of the matching rate. Decisions about ending19
partnerships are not influenced by the number of people currently searching for
partners.
Figure 5.1 shows the impulse response function for unemployment for any
impulse that triggers job destruction in  one extra duration category in period 1 but
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Figure 5.1 Impulse Response Function for Unemployment
In the steady state, partners remained paired through the eighth
productivity degradation. The  impulse underlying Figure 5.1 causes the cutoff to
switch to the seventh degradation just in period one.  Unemployment jumps
upward by the 11 percent of the labor force who would have been at the eighth
step.  As the bulge of unemployed workers make new matches, unemployment
declines. After 6 quarters, unemployment drops below its steady-state value. The
impulse response function has the property of  concentration, described in Hall
[1999b]. A burst of job destruction is followed by a period of lower than normal20
likelihood of further job destruction—the impulse response function drops below
normal for a period before leveling out to its steady-state average.
A. Technology shocks
Consider a shock that lowers the time effect in productivity,  zt , only in
period 1:  z1 1 <  and  z t t = > 1 1 ,   . The interest rate is at the same level,  r, in all
periods. The value transitions linking period 1 to the future are:
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Equation 5.6 shows that the value of being unemployed in period 1 is at its
steady-state value in period 1—a decline in the value of working in period 1 does
not affect the value of search, because the earliest a new match could be formed
would be in period 2, when productivity is back to normal. Two features of the
model result in this key simplification: the constant match rate and the exogenous
interest rate. Equation 5.7 shows that the lower value of  z1 implies that fewer
productivity states will be viable in period 1. In addition to normal job destruction
resulting from the random arrival of matches at the steady-state cutoff
productivity state, there is extra job destruction from moving the cutoff to a
lower-numbered productivity state. The actual level of cutoff productivity does
not change, but the lower value of  z1 means that the cutoff is achieved at a lower-
numbered state.
The effect of a temporary decrease in the productivity of goods production
is to shift resources into reorganization. If there is a period when it is not as21
desirable as usual to use labor to produce goods, that becomes a good time to
schedule reorganization. This is the idea in Hall [1991] made formal in this
model. My earlier paper stressed that there is a perfectly elastic supply of labor
for the production of goods, because of the alternative use of labor in reorganizing
the economy. Equation 5.7 embodies that horizontal labor supply schedule. The
opportunity cost of labor used in production, indexed by  U1+g , is not affected
by the temporary shift in productivity. Any theory of employment volatility has,
at its heart, an explanation of highly elastic labor supply. I find this explanation
more plausible, than, for example, theories where the alternative activities are
leisure or time spent working at  home (see Hall [1998]).
Because the response to the one-time technology shock causes job
destruction only in period 1, Figure 5.1 applies. The figure shows the response of
the unemployment rate to a reduction in aggregate technology of 2 percent. This
reduction is sufficient to trigger the destruction of jobs after the seventh step of
degradation as well as the usual destruction after the eighth step.
B. Interest-rate Shock
The analysis of a one-shot increase in the interest rate is a bit more
complicated, though the story comes out the same. With the technology index
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A level of  r1 above its normal level depresses both  Wt, 1 and  U1 below their
normal levels. I will show that the reduction in  Wt, 1 exceeds the reduction in  U1.
As a result, a sufficiently large increase in the interest rate will trigger job
destruction beyond what occurs in the steady state.
Consider any productivity state  t  that is viable in the steady state. From
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The hypothesis of steady-state viability implies that
W U t g , 1 1 ‡ + (5.11)
Thus the derivative of the viability criterion with respect to the interest rate is
strictly negative as long as the capital/labor ratio  g  is strictly positive. An
increase in the interest rate is likely to result in the destruction of jobs that are
near the margin of viability in the steady state.
In general, an increase in the interest rate will discourage all forms of
investment, both in physical capital and in reorganization. The experiment
considered here, however, relates only to the intertemporal effect on physical
capital, which is transmitted to employment because of the complementarity of
capital and labor in production. The technology permits the release of output at
the beginning of period 1 by reducing the level of capital carried through the
period. A high value of the interest rate  r1 signifies a high price of output
delivered at the beginning of period 1 in relation to output delivered at the
beginning of period 2. This intertemporal substitution mechanism is the subject of
Hall [1999a].23
On the other hand, the reorganization channel does not allow any
alteration in the amount of output delivered at the beginning of period 1.  Keeping
workers on the job rather than destroying their jobs could increase output in
period 2 at the expense of reorganization investment, but would not change the
amount of output available at the beginning of period 1 (if  g  were zero) and
would actually reduce the output available then if  g  were positive. A higher
interest rate in period 2 would induce job-preservation in period 1 with a
sufficiently low value of  g .
If  r1 is sufficiently above its steady-state level to trigger the destruction of
jobs in one additional productivity state, then the impulse response function will
be the one shown in Figure 5.1.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The economy faces an interesting tradeoff across steady states and over
time between producing goods and reorganizing. A higher permanent flow of
reorganization—modeled here as more search effort and higher unemployment—
results in higher productivity. But it reduces the fraction of the labor force
employed making goods. There is an optimal steady state that balances these
factors. The considerations governing the optimum are exactly the same as for the
tradeoff in the steady state between producing consumption and investment
goods.
The intertemporal tradeoff seems a promising way to explain the volatility
of employment and unemployment. One way or another, any successful theory of
volatility has to invoke high elasticity of labor supply. The theory of wage rigidity
is one approach, though its foundations in contract theory are yet to be poured.
The idea that workers substitute freely between work and leisure or other24
activities at home—the basis of employment volatility theories in the real
business cycle tradition—receives only modest support from the evidence on
individual behavior, despite heroic recent attempts. The idea promoted in this
paper takes unemployment seriously and not just as the residual from
employment. Unemployment is a productive economic activity. Although
unemployment increases arise from adverse developments—declines in
productivity or jumps in the interest rate—they can be understood in the
framework of value-maximizing behavior. Workers turn to reorganizing—finding
better job matches—when the relative reward to work declines temporarily or
when the interest rate is high.
The impulses I have considered are strictly temporary. Technology and the
interest rate return to normal after a single period. Persistent movements of
employment and unemployment are entirely the result of the dynamics of
matching. It is well known that simple matching is completely inadequate to
explain the observed persistence of unemployment (Cole and  Rogerson [1996]).
But it appears that a more sophisticated view of matching dynamics, incorporating
the extreme hazard of separation early in matches, can explain persistence (Hall
[1995] and Pries [1998]).
The standard of modern macroeconomics is the dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model. I have not made much progress developing the ideas
in this and related papers in general equilibrium. Of course, the exogenous real
interest rate could be rationalized in general equilibrium with linear intertemporal
preferences, but that is not a plausible specification. In an otherwise standard
DSGE model, I believe that it would be fairly easy to replicate my findings in this
paper for technology shocks, if the model contains a job destruction mechanism
along the lines of the one developed here. The reason is that almost nothing
happens to the interest rate in a standard DSGE model in response to technology
shocks. The interest rate is locked to the marginal product of physical capital. But25
its is correspondingly impossible to generate enough movement in the interest rate
to trigger job destruction from that source.26
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Appendix: Derivations of Matching Functions
I am grateful to Elizabeth O'Neil and Patrick O'Neil for the first of these
derivations.
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the probability of an odd number of searchers visiting a station. To evaluate the
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Now let  r N S = /  and consider the limit as  N become large and  r is held constant.






































B. Limit of One Match per Station








, which is  e N S - /  for large  N and  S. The probability that one searcher








, which is 
N
S
e N S - /  for large  N and  S. The rest of the
derivation appears in the body of the paper.